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OBSCENITY LAW IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTIONO BSCENITY has always been a nebulous word, meaning different things
to different people at different time periods; yet, the legal definition of
obscenity has not changed as much as one might imagine. Challenges to
the standards enunciated by the courts have been made over the years,
but the law has been somewhat slow in adapting its definition of obscenity
to the time period in which it is used. One's morals do change with the
times. What is allowed to be printed in literature, displayed on film, and
even depicted on stage today is quite different from what was tolerated a
short, thirty years ago. Whether this change is good or bad remains to
be seen.
State and local obscenity statutes are in force in one form or another
throughout the United States. At the same time in virtually every city of
any size one need only consult the local newspaper to get a listing of the
theatres and show times for viewing "hard core," sexually explicit, adult
films. If seeing it on film isn't enough, then one can always travel to
Times Square, (the heart of Broadway), in New York City and see a live
sex show on stage.
The Constitution of the United States expressly provides that Congress
shall make no law which abridges the freedom of speech or of the press.'
Obscenity is one form of expression and state obscenity statutes do try to
put some restraint on this type of expression. Any kind of restraint on
expression has always been given very careful review by the Supreme Court.
Individual states have the right to put some control on "obscene publications"
but their power is guided by major Supreme Court decisions in this area.
States have the power to virtually allow anything to be shown within
their territory through enactment of very liberal obscenity statutes as
well as in their enforcement. Again, one need only look to see what is
being tolerated in the Times Square area of New York City or the "Combat
Zone" of Boston versus what is being shown in Cincinnati, Ohio to under-
stand the point. (It is interesting to note, however, that there exists right
across the river from Cincinnati in neighboring Kentucky a prolific number
of adult bookstores and movie theaters.)
The press informs the public that it is next to impossible to extinguish
this kind of evil for a multitude of reasons.
But this result is not surprising as it is always difficult to prohibit any-
thing which a sizeable minority of the population desires. There is very
little to show for the huge amount of money spent in trying to stamp out
obscenity. Perhaps, as a result, it is time for public officials to re-evaluate
their goals and policies in this area.
'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
[520]
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Ohio's new obscenity statutes2 enacted in 1972 and made effective on
January 1, 1974 are interesting to examine in light of recent Supreme Court
holdings. The changes made in Ohio's obscenity statutes over the years
reflect the Supreme Court's guidelines in varying degrees. Before looking
at some of these recent statutes, as well as the present one in effect today,
it is necessary to review the major Supreme Court decisions which have
set these guidelines.
II. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF OBSCENITY BEFORE
THE ROTH DECISION
Regina v. Hicklin,3 an English case decided in 1868 provided the
first legal definition of obscenity used by states in this country. The pamph-
let under scrutiny by the Queen's Bench in Regina consisted of a series of
writings by theologians on the doctrine of the Romish Church. Apparently
only half of the book was alleged obscene. The test of obscenity as determined
by the Queen's Bench was "whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences."' Although the Court found the motives of the de-
fendant innocent regarding the distribution and sale of the book, since he dis-
tributed them solely for exposing what he considered to be the wrongs of
the Romish Church, the justices' order to destroy the publication was upheld
by the Queen's Bench. Defendant's innocent motives would not justify or
excuse his obscene publications. Parts of the Hicklin test can definitely be
found in early Ohio obscenity law.
United States v. Bebout,5 decided in 1886 was one of the first published
Ohio decisions which formulated a test to determine the obscenity of a
publication. In Bebout, defendants were indicted under the then existing
federal obscenity statute' for unlawfully and knowingly depositing in the
mails an obscene paper containing obscene words and illustrations. In
charging the jury, Justice Welker attempted to define an obscene publication.
According to Welker the word "obscene" as appearing in the statute was
to be given its common meaning as defined by a dictionary.7 The test to
be applied to determine whether a publication is obscene within the mean-
ing of the statute "is whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and
corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open to such influences. ... "8
This is the identical test which Lord Cockburn proclaimed in the Regina
decision. Thus, the early statutes tended to reflect a general concern as
2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01 - 2907.32 (Page 1973).
aL.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868).
4 Id. at 369.
5United States v. Bebout, 28 F. 522 (N.D. Ohio 1886).
6 REV. ST. U.S. § 3893.
7 28 F. at 524.
8 Id. at 524.
COMMENTWinter, 19801
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to the effect material of this nature would have on minors and those easily
influenced.
State v. Lerner,' decided in 1948, was an important decision regarding
obscenity for its time. In this case the defendant, owner of a bookstore in
Cincinnati, was indicted for offering for sale a magazine published by the
American Sunbathing Association, Sunshine and Health, and a series of
twelve photographs of a female strip tease act. The statute under which
the defendant was charged, provides in part:
Whoever knowingly sells, lends.... or publishes.., an obsence, lewd
or lascivious book, magazine.. . motion picture film or book, pamphlet,
paper, magazine not wholly obscene but containing lewd or lascivious
articles .... photographs.. . or advertises any of them for sale, ... or
manufacturers, draws, prints, or makes such articles or things, or sells,
gives away or shows to a minor, a book, pamphlet, magazine, news-
paper... devoted to publication... of criminal news, police reports,
or accounts of criminal deeds, lust or crime, or exhibits upon a street
or highway or in a place which may be within view of a minor, any of
such books.., shall be fined .... 1o
It was disclosed in the Lerner opinion that a couple of changes were
made to the statute in 1943 when it was re-enacted. One of those changes
was the addition of the clause "or book, pamphlet, paper, magazine not
wholly obscene but containing lewed or lascivious articles..." 1' as quoted
above. The statute then further defined not wholly obscene as being "any,
some obscenity, less than the whole.., an obscene verse, passage, photo-
graph, any obscene verse, passage, photograph, any obscene thing in a book
... "12 In other words, according to the revisions made to this statute in 1943,
one obscene passage in a book could now cause the entire publication to
be adjudged obscene and banned as a result. The standard used in this
statute was known as the "any obscenity" test, (any publication containing
any obscene drawing or picture). The "any obscenity" test, re-enacted in
Ohio by way of amendment in 1943, replaced the "wholly obscene" test
which had been previously used in the statute. Just as the name indicates,
under the "wholly obscene" test a work was judged by looking at the entire
article as a whole rather than by simply referring to a particular section.
Although section 13035, G.C.O. is much more specific and inclusive
one can't help but notice the similarities between this statute and what
was proclaimed in Regina. Again, section 13035, G.C.O. reflected a general
concern as to what effect certain kinds of published material would have
on minors. The "any obscenity" test can also be traced back to the days of
Regina.
9 51 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 81 N.E.2d 282 (1948).
10 G.C.O. § 3035 (Baldwin 1943).
11 51 Ohio L. Abs. at 324, 81 N.E.2d at 284.
12 d. at 324, 81 N.E.2d at 284.
[Vol. 13:3
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In that early English case,1" only half of the pamphlet in question was
considered obscene, but, this was sufficient by itself to judge the entire
writing obscene and banned as a result.
The Ohio court in Lerner concluded for the first time in Ohio that
"an obscene book must be held to be one 'wholly obscene' and that neces-
sarily in testing a literary work for 'obscenity' it must be viewed in its
entirety and only when and if the 'obscene' contents constitute the domi-
nant feature or effect does it fall within the forbidden class."1 The court in
Lerner recognized that as presently worded, strict enforcement of the statute
would prohibit the publication of any newspaper! 5 The fact that the Ohio
statute used a similar test for judging obscenity as was used in Regina
in 1863 was quite disturbing to Judge Struble:
How fundamentally unsound it is for example in Ohio for courts to
enforce the moral concepts of the people of England of what obscenity
in literature was in mid-Victorian times under a statute enacted in
1943 by the people of Ohio for the preservation of their own moral
concepts of what is "obscene literature."'"
The Court found the "any obscenity test" to be an invalid restraint on
the freedom of the press.
The defendant in Lerner was found not guilty in the sale and possession
of his obscene publications. The magazine alleged obscene contained a series
of nude pictures of men and women in nudist camps with captions em-
phasizing the good health of this alternative lifestyle. The court concluded
that nudity by itself was not obscene but would depend on how it is dis-
played instead. The series of twelve photographs of a woman disrobing
was not considered obscene, since the Court found nothing distasteful in
the manner in which she disrobed in the photographs.
The next significant case which had a major impact on Ohio's ob-
scenity law was the Supreme Court decision in Roth v. United States.'
III. ROTH V. UNITED STATES
Roth v. United States,'" decided in 1957, is the most important decision
rendered on the issue of obscenity and its holding called for a revision
of practically every state obscenity statute in the country. Roth was en-
gaged in the publication and sale of obscene literature. He was indicted
and found guilty of mailing obscene advertisements in violation of a federal
obscenity statute."
is L.R. 3 Q.B. at 360.
151 Ohio L. Abs. at 330, 81 N.E.2d at 287.
'5 Id. at 330, 81 N.E.2d at 287.
16Id. at 334, 81 N.E.2d at 290.
1 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
28 d.
19 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 768 (Current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1977)).
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The Court's historical analysis of obscenity and the first amendment
resulted in conclusion that obscenity was not protected under the Con-
stitution. The Court defined obscene material as "material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." The Court recog-
nized an important distinction between the portrayal of sex in art and
scientific works (which is given first amendment protection) and the por-
trayal of sex in obscene literature which is without protection.2"
The Court further announced that in judging whether a book is ob-
scene, it must be viewed as a whole unit rather than simply extracting
a section from it and judging the entire piece of literature obscene in light
of that one particular section.2" Just as the district court in Lerner outlawed
the "any obscenity test," the Supreme Court in Roth concluded that it
would be unconstitutional to judge material as obscene based upon an
isolated excerpt from the work.2"
The obscenity test advanced in Roth is the following:
[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.23
The test which was specifically rejected by the Court as being too re-
strictive was the standard found in Regina. " This old English test used by
some courts in one form or another for over eighty-nine years was finally
put to rest. It is significant that under the Roth test it is the average person
applying contemporary community standards who is to judge the impact
of the material. Older obscenity statutes judged material in light of the
effect it might have on those easily susceptible to influence or minors.
In Roth, the Court held that the fact that these statutes used words
such as "obscene" or "indecent" without further defining what kind of
conduct would come under those terms did not render such a statute
unconstitutional by itself. "These words, applied according to the proper
standard, for judging obscenity, already discussed, give adequate warning
of the conduct proscribed and mark boundaries sufficient to judge the law."2
The statute under which Roth was charged was upheld and the judgment
against him was affirmed. Thus, the argument that the statutes were un-
constitutional because they did not provide a reasonably ascertainable stand-
ard of guilt was rejected. Whether the Roth test would result in severe
censorship remained to be seen. That fear was put to rest in a series of
per curiam decisions reversing lower court obscenity convictions on the
20 354 U.S. at 487.
21 Id. at 489.
22 d.
28 Id.
24 L.R. 3 Q.B. at 360.
25 354 U.S. at 491.
[Vol. 13:3
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basis of the Roth decision.2" The Roth test was more clearly defined in sub-
sequent decisions.
In Smith v. California,2 the owner of a book store was convicted under
a city ordinance which made it unlawful "for any person to have in his
possession any obscene or indecent writing. [or] book. . . in any place of busi-
ness where ... books ... are sold or kept for sale."2 " The statute as con-
strued by the Supreme Court appeared to impose strict liability on simple
possession of an obscene publication without any proof of scienter. The
Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that a statute which im-
poses strict criminal liability on the bookseller without any proof of scienter
would inhibit constitutionally protected expression and as a result was
unconstitutional.29 The Court stated that:
[I]f the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the con-
tents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict
the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the state will
have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally
protected as well as obscene literature."0
The Court did make it clear that proof of knowledge of the contents of
the book could be satisfied in a prosecution by circumstantial evidence.
In other words, the State would not have to prove that they actually saw
the bookseller peruse the book in question to meet the mens rea requirement
which this court was now imposing in an obscenity trial.3 '
Jacobellis v. Ohio32 decided by the Supreme Court in 1964 cleared up
the problem of what was meant by contemporary community standards in
Roth. Nico Jacobellis, a manager of a theater in Cleveland was convicted
for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film. 3 The judgment against him
was affirmed in the court of appeals and in the Ohio Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding that the
French film called "Les Amants" was not obscene. In applying the stand-
ard set in Roth, the Court firmly held that only a national community
standard could be employed. The reason as stated by Justice Brennan:
A standard based on a particular local community would have the
intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the country
access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might be
26See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S.
35. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Sun-
shine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 372 (1958);
and Mounce v. United States, 247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 180 (1958).
27361 U.S. 147 (1959).
28 Id. at 148.
29 ld. at 155.
so ld. at 153.
31 Id. at 154.
32378 U.S. 184 (1964).
23 Oro REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (repealed 1974).
COMMENTWinter, 19801
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considered offensive to prevailing community standards of decency ....
Furthermore, to sustain the suppression of a particular book or film
in one locality would deter its dissemination in other localities where
it might be held not obscene, since sellers and exhibitors would be
reluctant to risk criminal conviction in testing the variation between
the two places."'
The Supreme Court during the Roth era was concerned with safeguarding
constitutionality protected expression which might be indirectly inhibited by
suppression of obscene material. This concern is not found in some of the
more recent Supreme :Court decisions decided by the Burger Court.
On March 21, 1966 the Supreme Court decided three major cases
in the area of obscenity: Memoirs v. Massachusetts,5 Ginzburg v. United
States,3" and Mishkin v. New York."' In Memoirs,3" the Supreme Court made
the Roth test more specific by requiring three elements to coalesce before
a work could be found obscene. In this case a suit was brought by the
Attorney General of Massachusetts to have the book Fanny HilP de-
clared obscene. The trial judge entered a decree which adjudged the book
obscene and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal.
In applying the Roth test, the Court held that three elements must be es-
tablished:
(a) ... the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to a prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value." (emphasis
added)
The lower court decision was reversed because the Supreme Judicial
Court erred in holding that a book need not be "unqualifiedly worthless before
it can be deemed obscene."" Here there was some evidence presented
which indicated that the book did have some social value and the judgment
was reversed as a result.
In Ginzburg," defendants, an individual and three corporations con-
trolled by him were charged with violating the federal obscenity statuteI3
34 378 U.S. at 193.
35 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
86383 U.S. 463 (1966).
37 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
8a 383 U.S. at 413.
89 J. CLELAND, FANNY HILL (1750).
40 383 U.S. at 418.
"I ld. at 419.
42 383 U.S. at 463.
48 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
[Vol. 13:3
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by using the mails to distribute obscene literature. The Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions in this case. In determining whether the publications
were obscene, the Court allowed the use of evidence to show the basis
upon which the publications were traded in the market place, the fact
that the editors emphasized the sexually provocative aspects of the publi-
cation in their advertising campaign, and other circumstantial evidence con-
cerning the mode of distribution. The Court held that this kind of evidence
was probative in determining whether a publication was obscene under Roth."'
In other words, a questionable publication might be adjudged obscene on the
basis of the context in which it is advertised and promoted and to whom the
advertising and promoting is directed.
Defendant in Mishkin," was charged and convicted under a New
York obscenity statute for publishing obscene books, possessing the books
with intent to sell them, and hiring others to write them. The New York
statute" under which defendant was convicted was stricter in its application
than the standard set by Roth. The New York obscenity statute was di-
rected towards prohibiting for sale only literature that would come under
the class of hard core pornography. The Court held that since "the definition
of obscenity is more stringent than the Roth definition, the judgment that
the constitutional criteria are satisfied is implicit in the application of section
1141 below." 7 The argument was also made in this case that some of the
literature was directed towards deviant sexual groups and that it would not
appeal to the prurient interest of the average person as set forth in Roth.
The Court rejected this argument and held that the requirements of Roth
would be met if the material appealed to the prurient interests of a member
of that deviant sexual group.
Redrup v. New York,' 8 was a very significant decision reached by the
Supreme Court in 1967 and it was subsequently used to reverse over thirty-
five obscenity convictions in the following years. 9 The defendant in Redrup
was a clerk at a New York City newsstand. In the racks at the newsstand
were two books alleged to be obscene. These books were sold by the de-
fendant to a plainclothes patrolman who had requested the purchase after
seeing them in the racks. Defendant was convicted of violating a state penal
law" and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. In a per curiam opinion,
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court took the following
into consideration in making its decision:
44 383 U.S. at 474.
45 383 U.S. at 502.
4" N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (repealed 1967).
4 "383 U.S. at 508.
48 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
49 Fahringeal and Brown, The Rise and Fall of Roth - A Critique of the Recent Supreme
Court Obscenity Decisions, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 785, 789 (1974). (Hereinafter referred to as
Fahringer).
50 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1141(1).
COMMENT
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In none of the cases was there a claim that the statute in question re-
flected a specific and limited state concern for juveniles. In none was
there any suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by publica-
tion in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling
individual to avoid exposure to it. And in none was there evidence
of the sort of 'pandering' which the Court found significant in Ginzburg
v. United States.
51
The Court held that the distribution of these publications were con-
stitutionally protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. This case
seemed to suggest that a book store could sell obscene books as long as
it did not actively solicit their sale, sell them to any minors, or display
them in such a manner that an unwilling individual could not avoid exposure
to them.
In a landmark case decided in 1969, the Supreme Court took its final
step towards offering some protection to obscene material by reversing a
conviction for mere private possession. In Stanley v. Georgia,5" defendant's
home was searched under an authorized search warrant as a result of de-
fendant's alleged involvement in tbookmaking activities. While searching
his house, authorities found some film. Upon viewing the film at the house,
defendant was arrested and subsequently convicted for having in his pos-
session obscene material in violation of a Georgia obscenity statute. 3
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court where the conviction
was reversed. The Court held "that the mere private possession of obscene
matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime."" The Court distinguished
the Roth holding that obscenity was not constitutionally protected on the
basis that Roth involved the regulation of commercial distribution of ob-
scene matter whereas in Stanley the state was trying to regulate mere private
possession. The Court strongly felt that the state had no right to tell any
one what they can read or view in the privacy of their home. To the Court
to hold otherwise would violate one's fundamental right to be free from
unwanted governmental intrusions.5"
IV. THE RETRACTION FROM STANLEY V. GEORGIA
The Court retracted from Stanley in 1971 in United States v. Reidel."6
Here defendant's indictment for mailing an obscene book to those who had
responded to his newspaper advertisement was dismissed by the district
court. The argument was made that since Stanley gave the right to private
possession of obscene material, then someone else ought to have the right
51386 U.S. at 770.
52394 U.S. 557 (1969).
53GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
54 394 U.S. at 559.
55 1 d. at 564.
58402 U.S. 351 (1971).
[Vol. 13:3
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to deliver the material to him.I The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered
the reversal of the district court judgment claiming that Roth had placed
the distribution of obscenity outside the realm of constitutional protection. 8
The Stanley decision was even more narrowly construed in United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs59 decided on the same day as the Reidal
case. Here the defendant had in his luggage thirty-seven pornographic
pictures and upon his return to this country from Europe customs agents
discovered them. The statute which defendant was charged with violating
barred the importation of obscenity for private use as well as for commercial
distribution." The Court held that the right to private possession of ob-
scenity in one's home established by Stanley did not extend to possession
of obscene materials at a port of entry." "Stanley's emphasis was on the
freedom of thought and mind in the privacy of the home. But a port of
entry is not a traveler's home."62
The Court used Reidal and Thirty-Seven Photographs to limit Stanley's
holding to the precise facts of that particular case. It certainly was an abrupt
change in the direction which prior case law had taken. This new attitude
towards obscenity reflected a new change in the Court's composition. Rich-
ard Nixon, elected to office in 1969, during his term was able to appoint
four new justices to the Supreme Court: Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist." At least in the area of obscenity the new attitude of the Court
was one of conservatism. The Burger Court decided that Roth and its
progeny had its day and should be replaced with a new test. The new replace-
ment came in June, 1973, with the announced opinions of Miller v. Calif-
ornia" and four other major cases dealing with obscenity: Paris Adult Theatre
v. Slaton," United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film,' United
States v. Orito,"7 and Kaplan v. California."8
V. THE MILLER DECISION AND ITS PROGENY
In Miller v. California" appellant was convicted for knowingly dis-
tributing obscene material.7 0 Appellant had conducted a large mailing cam-
57Id. at 354.
58 Id. at 355.
59402 U.S. 363 (1971).
so 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1977).
61 402 U.S. at 376.
62 1d.
6 3 Fahinger, supra note 49.
64413 U.S. 15 (1972).
65413 U.S. 49 (1973).
"413 U.S. 123 (1973).
67413 U.S. 139 (1973).
68413 U.S. 115 (1973).
69413 U.S. 15 (1972).
TO CAL. PNA. CODE § 311.2 (a) (West 1970).
COMMlENTWinter, 19801
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paign to advertise the sale of his obscene books. Five of his brochures had
been received by a manager of a restaurant who had not specifically re-
quested them. The brochures themselves contained explicit pictures.
The Court rejected the three stage test established in Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts"1 as being essentially unworkable. The Court felt that the burden
put on the state to prove that the material be utterly without redeeming
social value was virtually impossible to discharge."' The Court decided that
a more specific standard was needed. The replacement for the Memoirs
test was set forth in Miller:
a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest, b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law, and c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." (citations omitted).
According to Miller, every state obscenity statute must now specifically
delineate the actual sexual conduct being proscribed. It should be noted
that this is a three part test in the conjunctive. The Court explained in the
opinion that the test would only restrict hard core pornography. "Under the
holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the
sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or de-
scribe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by
the regulating state law, as written or construed."" It rejected the Jacobellis
holding and decided that a local community standard rather than a national
one could be used in judging obscenity."' "It is neither realistic nor con-
stitutionally sound to read the first amendment as requiring that the people
of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas, or New York City.""
In defense of this new test the Court pointed out that there was no
evidence that the strict censorship of sexual material during the 19th Cen-
tury limited serious literary, artistic or scientific works. The Court con-
cluded its argument by drawing an anology between the restriction of por-
nography and the restriction of heroin. "[C]ivilized people do not allow un-
regulated access to heroin because it is a derivative of medicinal morphine."7 7
Likewise, civilized people should not be allowed unregulated access to
pornography because it is a derivative of literature. Naturally many state
7 383 U.S. at 413.
72 413 U.S. at 21.
73 ld. at 24.
74 Id. at 27.
7id. at 31.
7e Id. at 32.
T? Id. at 36.
[Vol. 13:3
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obscenity statutes were rendered unconstitutional as a result of this decision
for lack of specificity of proscribed sexual conduct."'
In Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,9 petitioner owned two "adult" thea-
ters in Georgia. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films being shown
there were obscene and that their exhibition could be enjoined. The United
States Supreme Court vacated the state supreme court decision and re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of Miller. In this decision
the Supreme Court concluded that it was not necessary to introduce expert
evidence to prove the obscenity of the material when the actual material
is placed in evidence. The Court also decided that pornographic films were
not given constitutional protection simply because nothing on the outside
of the theater was offensive to passers-by or because the theater owner took
reasonable precaution in exhibiting the films only to consenting adults.
The Court justified its conclusion on the basis of the social interest in order
and morality. It also took note of the fact that a recent report indicated
that a correlation may exist between obscenity and crime.'
In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film,82 defendant
upon returning to the United States from Mexico had certain films, slides,
and photographs taken from him because they were allegedly obscene.
The materials in this case were being imported solely for private use un-
like the factual situation in the Thirty-Seven Photographs case. Once again
the Court refused to extend the holding in Stanley to this situation and
did not give any constitutional protection to the importation of obscene
material for private use. In this opinion the Court disclosed its dislike for
the Stanley holding by alluding to the fact that the decision would most
likely be different if Stanley were to be decided by this court today. As
Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissent:
[O]ne's Stanley rights could be realized . . . only if one wrote or de-
signed a tract in his attic and printed or processed it in his basement, so
as to be able to read it in his study."
Surely this was not the attitude of the Court when it decided Stanley in
1969.
Defendant in United States v. Orito,"5 was charged with knowingly
transporting obscene materials in interstate commerce in violation of a
federal statute. 5 The Court did not extend the constitutionally protected
78 See Fahringer, supra note 49, at 789.
79 413 U.S. at 49.
so Id. at 56. " .
-id. at 60, 61.
92 413 U.S. at 123.
83 Id. at 128.
84 ld. at 137.
85 413 U.S. at 139.
85d 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970).
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right of possessing obscenity in the privacy of one's home found in Stanley
to possession in an airplane.
It is sufficient to reiterate the well-settled principle that Congress may
impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the
channels of interstate commerce in order that those channels will not
become the means of promoting or spreading evil, whether of a phy-
sical, moral, or economic nature. 6
The proprietor of an adult bookstore in Kaplan v. California," was con-
victed under a state statute for selling an obscene unillustrated book. The
issue presented in this case was whether an unillustrated book by itself could
be considered obscene. The Court refused to afford constitutional protection.
The fact that minors were precluded from viewing the material had no
bearing to the Court on the constitutionality of the statute.
All five of these cases taken together had a major impact on state
obscenity statutes with the Miller decision providing the actual standard
to be used in judging obscenity.
VI. OHIo's RESPONSE To MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
At the time Miller and its progeny were decided, Ohio's obscenity
statutes were sections 2905.34 and .41. The constitutionality of these statutes
in light of Miller were upheld in two Ohio Supreme Court cases: Keating
v. Vixen," and Sensenbrenner v. Adult Book Store." In Vixen, an injunction
was issued by the trial court against the exhibition of the film, "Vixen,"
which was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio after being re-
manded by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration. The
Supreme Court of Ohio in its initial review of the case made the observations
that only about half of the film actually dealt with sex and that no genital
parts were exposed at all throughout the film.9" In light of these observa-
tions it is obvious that the film could not be considered "hardcore pornog-
raphy;" yet the injunction was allowed to restrain exhibition and Ohio's
obscenity statutes were upheld as comporting to the standards enunciated
in Miller. However, the Supreme Court in Miller expressly ruled that under
the new standard being imposed by them, nothing would be suppressed
that wouldn't be considered as "hard core pornography."" Less than three
months after the Miller decision a soft core film was restrained by the
Supreme Court of Ohio. The United States Supreme Court upon reviewing the
initial determination simply remanded it for further consideration. Why
'MId. at 144.
87413 U.S. at 115.
8835 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
89 35 Ohio St. 2d 220, 301 N.E.2d 695 (1973).
9027 Ohio St. 2d 278, 280, 272 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1971).
1413 U.S. at 27.
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this decision was not reversed in light of their own holding in Miller is not
known.
This decision is especially interesting in light of Jenkins v. Georgia,92
decided by the Supreme Court in 1974. In Jenkins appellant was con-
victed of violating Georgia's obscenity statute by exhibiting the "R rated"
film, "Carnal Knowledge." Surprisingly enough the Supreme Court re-
versed the Georgia Supreme Court decision because the film was not hard
core pornography.
Appellant's showing of the film "Carnal Knowledge" is simply not
"public portrayal of hard core sexual conduct for its own sake and
for the ensuing commercial gain" which we said was punishable in
Miller. We hold that the film could not, as a matter of constitutional
law, be found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way,
and that it is therefore not outside the protection of the First and Four-
teenth Amendment because it is obscene. 3
On January 1, 1974 a new series of Ohio obscenity statutes went
into effect." These new statutes are very similar to the prior statutes 3 with the
exception that the new statutes are more precise in defining what con-
stitutes obscenity. The new statute provides in part:
(A) No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or
performance involved, shall do any of the following:
(1) Create, reproduce, or publish any obscene material when the
offender knows that such material is to be used for commercial ex-
ploitation or will be publicly disseminated or displayed, or when he is
reckless in that regard.... ."
Definitions as provided under the Ohio Revised Code include:
(A) 'Sexual conduct' means vaginal intercourse between a male and
female, and anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons
regardless of sex ....
(E) Any material or performance is harmful to juveniles, if it is of-
fensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect
to what is suitable for juveniles, and if any of the following apply:
(1) It tends to appeal to the prurient interest of juveniles;
(2) It contains a display, description, or representation of sexual ac-
tivity, masturbation, sexual excitement, or nudity;...
(5) It makes repeated use of foul language;...
(7) It contains a display, description, or representation of criminal
92418 U.S. 153 (1974).
93 Id. at 161.
94 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01, .37 (Page 1975).
95 OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2905.34, .41 (repealed 1974).
96 Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (Page 1975).
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activity that tends to glorify or glamorize the activity, and that, with
respect to juveniles, has a dominant tendency to corrupt.
(F) When considered as a whole, and judged with references to ordi-
nary adults or, if it is designed for sexual deviates or other specially
susceptible group, judged with reference to that group, any material
or performance is "obscene" if any of the following apply:
(1) Its dominant appeal is to prurient interest;
(2) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting
sexual activity, masturbation, sexual excitement, or nudity in a way
that tends to represent human beings as mere objects of sexual appe-
tite;
(3) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting
bestiality or extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality;
(4) Its dominant tendency is to appeal to scatological interest by dis-
playing or depicting human bodily functions of elimination in a way
that inspires disgust or revulsion in persons with ordinary sensibilities,
without serving any genuine scientific, educational, sociological, moral,
or artistic purpose;
(5) It contains a series of displays or descriptions of sexual activity,
masturbation, sexual excitement, nudity, bestiality, extreme or bizarre
violence, cruelty, or brutality, or human bodily functions of elimination,
the cumulative effect of which is a dominant tendency to appeal to
prurient or scatological interest, when the appeal to such an interest
is primarily for its own sake or for commercial exploitation, rather
than primarily for a genuine scientific, educational, sociological, moral,
or artistic purpose.9"
There has been some question as to the constitutionality of this
statute in light of Miller. To reiterate, the three part test set forth in Miller
requires: 1) that the average person, applying contemporary community
standards must find that the work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest, 2) that the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and 3) that
the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.98 Looking at the new Ohio obscenity statute in light of Miller,
it should come as no surprise that its constitutionality has been questioned.
VII. OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2907.01 VERSUS
THE MILLER STANDARD
The appellant in State v. Burgun,'9 (Burgun I), was convicted under sec-
tion 2907.32(A) for pandering obscenity. Dalene Burgun worked in a news
store in Cleveland which sold in the front section of the store magazines
such as Better Homes and Gardens, Flying, etc., while the back of the store
11 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (Page Supp. 1978).
98 413 U.S. at 24.
9949 Ohio App. 2d 112, 359 N.E.2d 1018 (1976).
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exhibited sexually oriented material for sale. The back section also con-
tained several coin-operated booths where an individual could view a short,
hard core pornographic film. In this case the Court of Appeals had the
opportunity to consider the issue of the constitutionality of section 2907.01.
Although the Court found the statute as being overbroad on its face be-
cause it did not incorporate all three elements of the Miller test, it never-
theless upheld its constitutionality on the basis that the trial judge had
narrowed the statutory definition of obscenity to comply with the Miller
requirements in his instructions to the jury.1 °0 The Court of Appeals cited
to Miller and other decisions to substantiate their ruling. Indeed, the state-
ment was made in Miller that, "If a state law that regulates obscene material
is thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment values ap-
plicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately pro-
tected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent
review of constitutional claims when necessary."' 01
However, in a subsequent case, State v. Burgun (Burgun II) decided
in August, 197712 the Sixth District Court of Appeals held that it was
not necessary to narrowly construe section 2907.01 to comply with Miller.
Because the United States Supreme Court previously upheld Ohio's former
definition of obscenity,' the new Ohio obscenity statute would likewise
not be considered overbroad or vague. The new obscenity statute'O° differs
from the prior statute1"' only in its greater precision regarding the kinds
of sexual conduct which could be defined as obscene. Therefore, for pur-
poses of instruction to a jury, it is sufficient that ". . . they need only con-
sider the statutory definition of obscenity, section 2907.01 (F) in de-
termining whether or not material is obscene... ."I" However, another
Ohio court one month later did not agree."'
Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, °8 was a district court case decided in
October, 1977. Sovereign News was a corporation involved in the distribu-
tion of adult books, magazines, and films. Much of this case deals with the
question of using certain evidence seized during the search of Sovereign's
premises in the prosecution. Once again, Plaintiff argued that sections
2907.01 and 2907.32 were unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The
district court in this case agreed with the plaintiff.
The Court began its determination of this issue by providing a short
100 Id. at 123.
101 413 U.S. at 25.
10 State v. Burgun, Slip. Op. No. 36078 (D. Ohio, filed Aug. 18, 1977).
103 35 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
04 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.01.
105 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.34.
0 6 Burgun, Slip Op. No. 36078.
107448 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
08 id.
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synopsis of the history of freedom of expression. The Court explained that
pure expression which includes the printed media, books, and motion
pictures, could not be restricted unless the State could prove the following:
(1) A clear and present danger is presented to society by the pure
expression, (2) The individual's interest in having the pure expression
allowed is outweighed by the danger presented to society by permitting
the conduct; and (3) The government has used the narrowest re-
striction on pure expression consistent with the furtherance of the
governmental interest involved."°"
Obscenity is not given this protection and the dissemination of such ma-
terial may be restricted without meeting this "clear and present danger"
test. To this court, the issue to be determined was whether sections 2907.01
and 2907.32 prohibit the dissemination of non-obscene material. These
Ohio statutes would be considered overbroad if they restrict the dissemina-
tion of non-obscene material because they would be restricting pure ex-
pression without meeting the three-pronged clear and present danger test.1
This court came to the conclusion that section 2907.01 restricted con-
stitutionally protected expression in four different instances:
First: section 2907.01 (F)(1)(2)(3)(4) and (5) fail to incorporate
the three-part Miller test. The Miller test is a conjunctive three-part test,
all three parts of which must be satisfied before the material may be
found obscene. However, under Ohio revised Code 2907.01 material
may be found obscene without the state being required to prove each
of the three parts of Miller ....
Second: section 2907.01 (F) (3) unconstitutionally restricts the display
or depiction of extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality. It is
an express holding of Miller that only material depicting or describing
sexual conduct may be barred as being obscene ....
Third: sections 2907.01 (F) ( 1) (2) (3) and (5) unconstitutionally re-
strict the display and description of non-active sexual conduct. For
example, simple nudity, such as the showing of a female breast or a
male buttocks may be considered obscene under sec. 2907.01 (F) ....
Fourth: section 2907.01 (F) (1) does not define with requisite speci-
ficity the sexual acts the description or depiction of which is restricted.
Subsection (F) (1) declares that any material whose "dominant ap-
peal is to prurient interest" is obscene. The subsection is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad because it does not list the types of sexual con-
duct to be restricted, and therefore may be applied to the depiction
of sexual conduct not subject to restriction."'
The court disagreed with the Burgun II finding that section 2907.01
is constitutional without a limiting instruction to the jury.
109 Id. at 391.
"Old. at 393.
I Id. at 400.
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Because this court has found [section] 2907.01 to be overbroad on its
face, and that it has not been narrowed to constitutionally permitted
parameters by an authoritative state court interpretation, the Court
finds Ohio Revised Code sec. 2907.01 and 2907.32 to be overbroad.uz
The next issue to be decided by the district court in Sovereign, was
whether the statute should be declared unconstitutional as a result. The Court
came to the conclusion that it was unconstitutionally overbroad. Recogniz-
ing the fact that some overbroad statutes may be validated by a narrowing
construction by the state courts, the court felt that it could not reasonably
be done in this instance. Taking into account the fact that the statute goes
beyond the mere suppression of obscene material in four places and the
fact that the statute impinges on a first amendment right, the court con-
cluded that section 2907.01 was "[s]o substantially overbroad that only
radical surgery could save it.""' Thus, under the principles established in
the Supreme Court case, Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,"' the Ohio statute was
unconstitutional to this court. In Erznoznik the Court held "that a state
statute should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject
to a narrowing construction by the state courts...
VIII. THE RESPONSE BY THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the State v. Burgun"' decision
and upheld the lower court's determination on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of section 2907.01.1" The court in arriving at its decision again
relied on the fact that the United States Supreme Court had already upheld
the predecessors of section 2907.01, sections 2905.34 and 2905.35 in
two prior decisions: Sensenbrenner v. Book Store"8 and Keating v. Vixen."19
However, the Ohio Supreme Court did overrule Burgun I and held that the
statute was "[n]ot unconstitutionally overbroad nor void for vagueness when
read in pari materia with the Miller decision. The Miller test for defining
obscenity is, therefore, incorporated into that statute by an "authoritative"
State Court construction specifically sanctioned by Miller."' This decision
was subsequently upheld in State v. Thomas. 2'
IX. CONCLUSION
The fact that the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Ohio's obscenity statute is not surprising in light of the Sensenbrenner and
"2 Id. at 402.
"23 Id. at 405.
114 422 U.S. 205 (1973).
15 Id. at 216 citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 (1965).
11649 Ohio App. 2d at 112, 359 N.E.2d at 1018.
117 56 Ohio St. 2d 354, 384 N.E.2d 255 (1978).
I's 35 Ohio St. 2d at 220, 301 N.E.2d at 695.
219 35 Ohio St. 2d at 215, 301 N.E.2d at 880.
120 State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354, 358, 384 N.E.2d 255, 261 (1978).
121 57 Ohio St. 2d 71, 387 N.E.2d 229 (1979).
Winter, 19801 COM MENT
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss3/5
AKRON LAW REVIEW
Vixen decisions. Section 2907.01 is sufficiently similar to section 2905.34
that in all likelihood the United States Supreme Court would also uphold its
constitutionality if ever called upon to decide that question. The real mis-
take occurred when the Supreme Court remanded the Sensenbrenner and
Vixen cases to the Ohio courts for further consideration instead of reversing
the convictions and holding the applicable obscenity statutes unconstitu-
tional in light of Miller. Sovereign News Co. had clearly pointed out the
major problems with the statutes; yet, there has been no response by the
Supreme Court regarding any of these issues raised when it has had the
chance. There are flagrant violations of the Miller standard set forth in
section 2907.01, yet it has been given full effect for close to six years. The
Supreme Court has refused to act rationally in the area of obscenity re-
flecting the individual members' personal biases and prejudices.
The United States Supreme Court has failed to truly demonstrate why
they or anyone else should have the authority to tell consenting adults what
they can see or read. The Court in Miller justified its censorship by com-
paring the distribution of pornography with heroin. But access to heroin
has never been given explicit protection in the Constitution. The first
amendment gives constitutional protection to free speech and the press.
Roth carved out a narrow exception within the area of constitutionally
protected speech and press by not extending protection to obscenity.
Justice Douglas, vigorously dissenting from the majority, did not agree for
he saw no such exception written into the first amendment and felt that
the Court did not have the right to create one now.'22 To Douglas, the only
kind of speech which could be regulated was speech that had "some relation
to action which could be penalized by government."' 23 The arousal of sexual
thoughts has never been the kind of action which could be penalized by the
government of this country; therefore it is impermissible to completely pro-
hibit obscenity according to Douglas.
The liberal approach taken by Douglas in Roth and in subsequent
decisions is completely opposite from the approach taken by the Burger
Court. However, the majority in Roth, recognizing the importance of protect-
ing fundamental freedoms of speech and press, realized that any exceptions
to these constitutional freedoms should be very carefully scrutinized.
Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their (freedom of
speech and press) erosion by Congress or by the States. The door
barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar;
it must be tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary
to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.2"
122 354 U.S. at 509.
123 Id.
'
2 Id. at 488.
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Clearly, Ohio's obscenity statutes leave the door ajar but now the
Supreme Court is unwilling to close it.
All the same, pornography is present in most large Ohio cities as
well as in other cities in other states. It wouldn't exist if people didn't
desire it. Money, perhaps, would be better spent controlling it rather than
trying to oppress it. What has happened in Boston is noteworthy. There
a specific section of the city called the "Combat Zone" has been zoned for
commercial distribution of obscenity. In other words adult bookstores, sex
shops, and movie theaters are kept and tolerated within this one area.
This enables the public to avoid exposure to these kinds of establishments
if they so desire by avoiding that particular section of the city where it
is tolerated while providing an access to this material to those who wish
to purchase it. It is an interesting solution to the problems associated with
the distribution of obscenity and should be given careful thought and con-
sideration by other cities.
Since the United States Supreme Court is currently unwilling to re-
form unconstitutional state obscenity statutes, the burden of protecting the
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press now falls on the in-
dividual state courts and legislators. These freedoms must be protected for
they are the essence of a free society.
RICHARD H. HARRIS
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